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Xavier Guchet 
Abstract: This paper discusses the common view that nanotechnology blurs 
the boundary between nature and artifact. At first glance, this claim seems to 
be justified by the ‘artificial molecular machines’ which play a central role in 
the development of nanotechnology. However in considering a few examples 
of design of artificial molecular machines, I first argue that the dual trend of 
artificialization of nature and naturalization of artifacts is not consistent. This 
antinomy is based on a tacit and never-questioned metaphysical assumption: 
nature and artifacts cannot be ontologically balanced. Their opposition relies 
on other conceptual divides between structure and operation, between being 
and becoming in classical metaphysics. I try to demonstrate that nanotechnol-
ogy undermines this traditional metaphysical view. Nature cannot be de-
scribed as a separate and permanent entity. It is more adequately characterized 
as a set of processes homogeneous with technological processes. Thus, far 
from erasing nature, nanotechnology conveys an operational view of nature 
that precisely belongs to a Techno-logy. 
Keywords: artifact, metaphysics, nature, operation, technology. 
1. Introduction 
It is commonly stated that nanotechnology is going to drastically change our 
relation to nature. This assumption not only concerns our technical abilities, 
but also our representation of nature loaded with metaphysical presupposi-
tions. In fact, nanotechnology should be used in the plural (nanotechnolo-
gies). As suggested by a recent list set up by Fern Wickson (2008) there is 
more than one narrative of nature in current laboratory research in the nano-
scale field. This variety of views is largely generated by the wide spectrum of 
applications envisaged and their potential impacts on environment, health, 
and society. However if we consider exclusively the kind of basic research 
that is conducted in French laboratories it is possible to identify one pre-
dominant view of nature, which deserves to be closely examined. 
  Let us start with a reference to the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-
Ponty who delivered a lecture on nature at the Collège de France by the end 6 Xavier  Guchet 
of the 1950s (Merleau-Ponty 2003). Nature, he said, can no longer be dis-
cussed (philosophically) without considering cybernetics. Merleau-Ponty did 
not mean that cybernetics had shaped a definite philosophy of nature and 
that cyberneticists were de facto philosophers. He claimed that cybernetics 
did outmode some conceptions of nature and that a new ontological basis 
was needed. The same goes for nanotechnologies today. We cannot deal with 
nature without dealing with nanotechnology and also biotechnology. As with 
cybernetics, these so-called transformational technologies certainly do not 
contain a ready-made view on nature – conceived by whom anyway? By the 
scientists themselves, giving their research a truly philosophical turn? That is 
not their role. However these technologies force us to give up some meta-
physical presuppositions underlying our usual representations of nature. This 
is what we mean by a new conception of nature in nanotechnology, and this 
article is an attempt to give an insight on that new conception. 
  This view of nature cannot be separated from a view of artifacts. As Mer-
leau-Ponty argued in the same lecture, our idea of nature is always pervaded 
with artifacts. To display the concept of nature in nanotechnology means 
first and foremost to describe the artifacts designed by nanoscientists. To do 
so we will rely on a few examples of artifacts designed in a number of French 
laboratories that have been studied in our research program. 
2. Artificializing Nature, Naturalizing Artifact 
Nanotechnology blurs the boundaries between nature and artifact. This 
seemingly clear and simple statement suggests that nanotechnology generates 
new underlying views of nature. The role of the philosopher would be to turn 
them into explicit statements. The task turns out to be more complicated 
than expected when comes the need to clarify the meaning of this ‘blur’. Is it 
to say that there is a shift in the boundaries, the artificial field cutting down 
on the natural field? One would object that there is nothing new about that: 
Homo habilis had already thoroughly altered his relation to matter and 
‘blurred’ the boundary between nature and artifact. Nanotechnologies would 
only be the continuation of a process started with Homo habilis two million 
years ago. Yet specifying the meaning of this process brings forward another 
difficulty, as two alternative theories conflict. 
  The first theory stipulates that nanotechnologies genuinely achieve the 
program of ‘artificialization of nature’ which is said to define modernity. We 
are now in the all-artificial era. The ability to operate at the nanoscale in order 
to manipulate nanoobjects one by one, whether they be atoms or molecules, 
would gradually erase nature from our environment and even from our body.    Nature and Artefact in Nanotechnologies  7 
  The second theory on the contrary stipulates that the realm of nature is 
increasing, because artifacts become less and less distinguishable from natural 
beings. Molecular machines are just molecules provided by nature. For in-
stance a group of French physicists managed to control the motion of a bi-
phenyl molecule adsorbed on a silicon surface. By means of electronic stimu-
lation, they designed a bistable molecular configuration – the biphenyl bista-
ble – which acts as a molecular switch (Mayne et al. 2004). According to a 
physicist met at a conference, this is an entirely ‘natural’ object, as a molecule 
is a natural thing – as opposed to the switches we use in our daily life at the 
macroscale and which are typically ‘artificial’. This physicist obviously sees 
the molecule from the point of view of its action. On the other hand, he 
considers the ‘macro’ switch from the point of view of its production: it is 
‘artificial’ because it has been manufactured. But strictly speaking, this switch 
is as ‘natural’ as the biphenyl molecule when seen from the point of view of 
what it does. On the other hand, the molecule is as ‘artificial’ as the switch 
when considered from the point of view of its production: it has been syn-
thesized in a laboratory. In this case, the ‘blurring’ of the boundary between 
nature and artifact comes from a confusion between action and production, 
between how nano-objects work and how they are produced.  
  The claim of the ‘naturalization of artifacts’ holds another argument, 
chiefly defended by the physicist Richard Jones (2004): scientists will operate 
successfully at the nanoscale if they rely on the design strategies invented by 
nature. Nature has indeed optimized its operations at the nanoscale. There is 
no way we can do any better than nature at that scale. This argument stands 
in favor of an approach to nanotechnology in terms of ‘making do’, or ‘driv-
ing natural processes’ instead of manufacturing strictly speaking. The point is 
not to impose a blueprint on matter, but rather to ‘drive’ natural processes 
that would happen without us. 
  As pointed out by a number of scholars there is a tension between the 
two processes of ‘artificialization of nature’ and ‘naturalization of artifacts’ in 
nanotechnologies. Jean Pierre Dupuy (2004) for instance stressed what he 
believes to be the ‘metaphysical research program’ underlying the program of 
Converging Technologies. According to him, the so-called Nano-Bio-Info-
Cogno convergence program displays a tension – the same one that under-
mined the first cybernetics – between the ambition to control nature and the 
ambition to give rise to emergent properties in complex systems – complex in 
the way Von Neumann defined it. The behavior of complex systems would 
thus be unpredictable like living beings (naturalization of artifact). According 
to Dupuy, the absence of control is no accident, but the very aim of the de-
signers of nanodevices. 
  Alfred Nordmann (2005) came to similar conclusions: we are now techni-
cally able to operate on nature at the nanoscale, but we cannot actually have a 8 Xavier  Guchet 
genuine representation of the causality implied by this operation. During a 
seminar, a physicist mentioned that he was puzzled by the action of a mo-
lecular machine that can be individually activated. We can fuel power in the 
molecule but we do not know when and how it will start working. We are 
able to trigger effects that are impossible to track or to observe (like GMO 
dissemination or wild self-replication of Drexler’s universal assemblers: once 
released in nature, it becomes impossible to discern GMO from a natural 
process). In the end the artifacts we manufactured act like nature. There is no 
difference anymore between technological objects in action and natural proc-
esses (‘naturalization of artifacts’). 
  We are thus confronted with two apparently conflicting statements: 
nanotechnologies are integral part of a process of ‘artificialization of nature’; 
nanotechnologies are related to a process of ‘naturalization of artifacts’. Both 
theses can be supported by equally valuable arguments. Now this situation is 
what Kant called an antinomy, that is to say a dialectical use of our ability to 
know beyond the limits of possible experience. We claim to forge an objec-
tive criterion allowing us to distinguish nature from artifact, like others 
claimed to objectively define the world as being finite or infinite. The French 
philosopher François Dagognet (2000) suggested to get out of this antinomy 
by considering the idea of nature a ‘misconception’, while still acknowledging 
its regulating value. He consequently proposed to consider nature as a regu-
lating idea of pure reason rather than as a set of phenomena. At this point our 
initial question can be reformulated in these terms: How do we understand 
that the distinction between nature and artifact needs – apparently – to be 
cast beyond the limits of objective knowledge? 
3. Nanosciences and the Critic of Metaphysics 
I suggest here to turn to the criticism of western metaphysics developed by 
the philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1952/53). Metaphysics relies on a dis-
junction between being and becoming, between the structures and the opera-
tions in the being. This disjunction is, according to Simondon, the meta-
physical basis of modern science. To become an object of science the being 
had to be placed in the framework of absolute determinism, deprived of any 
internal dynamism, as opposed to the subject who retrieved all the operating 
dynamism from which the being has been emptied of. Thus operations de-
void of all objectivity were identified with the spontaneity of the subject 
applied to phenomena, i.e. to structural realities. The Kantian theory of ob-
jective knowledge, which was Simondon’s main target, rests on the dichot-
omy between structures and operations. In particular this dichotomy under-  Nature and Artefact in Nanotechnologies  9 
lies the contrast between nature, defined by the stability of a safe ontological 
ground (structures), and artifact (operations) that connotes corruption, in-
stability, becoming, and process. Nature is a primary stable state, and tech-
nology spoils it, corrupts it. Technology denatures.  
  This might be a way of interpreting the awkward situation nanotechnol-
ogy confronts us with. Our trouble can indeed be explained by our commit-
ment to a kind of spontaneous Kantianism. We tend to evaluate nanotech-
nology on the basis of this classical divide between structures and operations, 
underlying the Kantian theory of knowledge. This common sense Kantianism 
is also expressed in the definition of artifact as ‘what is man-made’: products 
(constituted structures) can be sorted into two categories according to 
whether man is or is not involved in their production. Artificial beings refer 
to human designers while natural beings refer to nature – their producer. In 
both cases, the productive operations are separated from their results, and 
referred to an external origin (man or nature). The working structures can be 
described apart from their production process. In thus isolating working 
structures from their production process, we can adopt Descartes’ famous 
claim according to which all things that are artificial are also natural. Obvi-
ously ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ things work according to the same natural laws. 
According to Kant (1790), only living beings challenge the divide between 
structure and operation. Kant defined them as ‘organized beings’ meaning 
that they self-organize: structure and operation (‘formative force’, bildende 
Kraft) are inseparable. That is the reason why Kant assumed that self-
organization was beyond the boundaries of objective knowledge.  
  Now laboratory nano-objects also resist the metaphysical divide between 
structure and operation, which generates the apparent antinomy between 
‘artificialization of nature’ and ‘naturalization of artifact’. The striking point 
is not that they blur the boundary between nature and artifact, which would 
not be new. Rather they blur a more fundamental distinction between struc-
tures and operations. Considering the common sense Kantianism, nano-
objects would not fulfill the conditions for objective knowledge, hence the 
antinomy. In other words, nano-objects (at least some of them) do not fit in 
the metaphysical divide between structure and operation, between their pro-
duction and action.  
  The distinction between nature and artifact in nano-objects should there-
fore be interpreted in terms of operations immanent to structures rather than 
in terms of operations separated from working structures, according to the 
opposition between what is ‘man-made’ and what is not.  
  Nanoscientists, as it happens, are very serene in expressing the prevalence 
of ‘process’ and ‘operations’ both in nature and artifacts. They do not make 
any difference between structures and operations. To them, nature is not a 
field of ontological stability, a set of given structures that technological op-10 Xavier  Guchet 
erations would denature. When they talk about nature, they are more con-
cerned by ‘what it does’, than by ‘what it is’.  
  The shift from being to doing could be misunderstood as a reactivation of 
the old cliché of God as the great architect. However to nanoscientists, there 
is no ‘art’ at work in nature. Their vocabulary simply suggests that nature is 
better described in terms of operations, processes, rather than in terms of 
structures. That nature ‘does this or that’ does not mean that nature is a kind 
of skillful engineer, but that nature is pure processuality, operationality. Al-
though the metaphor of the skilful engineer occasionally surfaces in their 
discourse, most scientists who refer to the engineer, do not mean that there 
is an intelligent design in nature imposing a pre-established plan upon a pas-
sive matter. It is the ‘processualization’ of nature that makes the analogy 
between technical and natural operations possible. 
4. A Laboratory Experiment: Remaking the E. Coli 
Flagellum Nanomotor 
Nanoscientists do not bother much about Kantian metaphysics. But the re-
evaluation of nature in terms of process actually existed in contemporary 
science long before the nanotechnology boom. Science does not describe 
nature anymore, it establishes it, creates it, invents it; doing is replacing being; 
science is more concerned with intervening than with representing, as Ian 
Hacking (1983) already pointed a few decades ago.  
  Let me illustrate this with a current research project on the synthesis of a 
nanomotor. The researchers involved in this project aim to remake the E. 
Coli flagellum nanomotor.
1 The structure and the operation of this nanomo-
tor remain a mystery to biologists. They do neither know how its forty-five 
proteins are arranged, nor how they produce electromechanical motion, nor 
do they know its building design. The experiment aims at testing a model 
describing the mechanical working of the nanomotor: does it or not conform 
to the proteins’ actual spatial arrangement?  
 The  design strategy consists in building the nanomotor on a solid surface 
using the proteins’ self-assembling mechanisms. The first step consists in 
isolating the four proteins responsible for the motor’s rotation, to produce 
more of them and to purify them. The second step consists in preparing the 
solid surface on which the proteins will be printed and will have to self-
assemble. The idea is to make the surface mimic the bacterial membrane. This 
strategy uses the soft lithography technology at the nanoscale. It relies on the 
hypothesis that the proteins will self-assemble on this biomimetic surface the 
same way they do in a living organism. The third step consists in imaging the   Nature and Artefact in Nanotechnologies  11 
thus obtained molecular structures at their different stages – by means of an 
Atomic Force Microscope – to test the mechanical model. 
 Three  design strategies were considered: (i) a bottom-up strategy consist-
ing in assembling the motor step by step according to a pre-established plan – 
which is impossible to put into practice considering that the actual building 
plan of the biological motor is still unknown.; (ii) a genetic engineering strat-
egy consisting in ‘emptying’ the bacterium of its functionalities to replace 
them by others – the aim here is not to re-engineer the nanomotor in the 
laboratory, but to functionalize the bacteria; iii) the third strategy is the one 
described earlier. From the point of view of the production process, in the 
first strategy the motor is purely artificial; in the second one its functional-
ities are artificial but the motor is natural (bacteria are instrumentalized); but 
in the third one, the one I am dealing with here, the situation is more com-
plex. Christophe Vieu, head of a Nano research group in Toulouse, claims 
that if they succeed in their experiment, their nanomotor could be as ‘natural’ 
as biological motors. According to him, the distinction between natural and 
artificial machines is fading away, which is definitely anti-Kantian. Indeed, 
Kant (1790) carefully distinguished the beings that exist as art products – for 
instance a watch made by a watchmaker – from beings that exist as natural 
ends, that is to say living beings as self-organizing systems. The distinction 
between artificial and natural machines is not justified considering their be-
havior once they are produced: take a living being and a watch, both are ‘ma-
chines’ that behave following the universal laws of nature (according to 
Kant). However, considering their production, the two kinds of machines 
should be distinguished: the production of a self-organized being, according 
to Kant, follows a kind of causality unknown to us, that can neither be as-
similated with nexus effectivus (the causality of the universal mechanism) nor 
with nexus finalis (the causality linked to finality, following the example of 
the watch).  
  However nanoscientists may well manage to create artificially the condi-
tions under which this very weird kind of causality would operate. The rea-
son why they claim that in case of success there would be no difference be-
tween the nanomotor built in the laboratory and biological motors, is that 
they look at nature as a set of operations. Far from considering nature as a set 
of structures devoid of operations (which according to Simondon (1952/53) 
is the foundation of Kantianism) they see nature as a process. If they seem to 
ignore the divide between nature and artifact it is because they only look at 
nature’s operations. If they occasionally talk about nature’s plan, thus bring-
ing back the figure of the skillful engineer, this term does not refer to a hid-
den metaphysics. It is just a metaphor. On the other hand, when nanoscien-
tists claim that the same mechanisms are at work in biological nanomotors 
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natural and artificial based on the production origin (the self-assembling 
mechanisms) and no longer refer to the working conditions. In the case of 
the biological motor, bacteria and the processes determine these conditions; 
in the case of the laboratory nanomotor, the conditions are defined by the 
coupling between the solid surface, the probe microscope, and the produc-
tion and purification of proteins. The two objects can be considered identical 
abstractly speaking, but considering their actual production and working 
conditions, the two motors cannot be identified. If we push further this cou-
pling between operations and structures, the laboratory nanomotor can nei-
ther be called ‘artificial’ (the nanoscientists are right) nor can it be called 
‘natural’ (they are therefore also wrong). But what remains of the distinction 
between nature and artifact in this case? Is it obsolete, ineffective? My answer 
is no. 
5. Towards a New ‘Natural State’? 
The experiment on the biphenyl molecule is uppermost significant from a 
cognitive point of view. The aim here is to study natural phenomena such as 
molecular dynamics or electron transfer through a single molecule. One 
would say that these phenomena have always been there, even if we have had 
to wait for the scanning tunneling microscope to observe them. This asser-
tion seems hard to refute. A robust realism tells us that nature is not the 
product of our activity; it does not owe us anything. However, this concep-
tion of nature as a timeless reality to be progressively unveiled is based on a 
fiction. It assumes indeed that we could have a view of nature devoid of any 
historical context. We know that our view of nature radically changed over 
time according to the investigation tools that have been used. Nature has 
changed for us. However, all this does not affect nature in itself, eternal and 
unalterable. As if we could pull out of the ‘dispositif’
2 that we use to investi-
gate nature that shapes us historically and defines at a given moment what is 
visible and what is not, what is expressible and what is not. As if we could 
take a timeless view on nature – that is a fiction, of course, making us believe 
that it is possible to rise above the ‘dispositif’ that shapes us. As if we could 
actually climb on our own shoulders. Common sense realism is misleading in 
assuming that nature contains the ‘dispositif’ that shape human existence 
historically, but it is actually the other way round. Nature is not a construc-
tion of our mind; it is external to us, however the relationship we have with it 
is shaped by our ‘dispositif’. What belongs to nature at a given moment is 
therefore determined by our ‘dispositif’.    Nature and Artefact in Nanotechnologies  13 
  This distinction between nature ‘to us’ and nature ‘in itself’ is a conse-
quence of the metaphysical divide between structures and operations. Nature 
is on the side of ontological stability; technology is about becoming, corrup-
tion, instability, and process. In rejecting this metaphysical divide we get rid 
of the fiction of a timeless nature waiting for being unveiled by our ‘disposi-
tif’. As the French philosopher Serge Moscovici (1977) claimed, what is in 
nature at a given moment depends on our artifacts. Material forces have no 
reality without the skills and mediations allowing to access them. Nature and 
artifact are not located on either side of a boundary that would shift or fade 
away, as if there could be, as if there ever was nature distinct from artifact. 
Nature and artifact are two abstractions from the same reality, that of a his-
torically given ‘natural state’, defined by a specific coordination system be-
tween human skills and material forces. 
  At this point a new question follows: to what extent do nanotechnologies 
generate a new relation between material processes and human actions, a new 
‘natural state’? Far from impoverishing the concept of nature, nanoscience 
enriches it, by adding more content to it. For example, the re-engineering of 
E. Coli flagellum nanomotor induces a new relationship between man and 
matter. In this case, the task of machine building is commissioned to matter 
itself. In other words, the machine building is embedded in the mechanisms 
of nature. As the machine maker’s substitute, nature is not necessarily assimi-
lated to a kind of skillful engineer. Nanoscientists carefully avoid all anthro-
pomorphic interpretation. 
6. Conclusion 
The new ‘natural state’ conveyed by the experiment on the E. Coli flagellum 
nanomotor (if the experiment turns out to be a success) results from an ap-
proach to both nature and artifact as processes, and has nothing to do with 
the Kantian dichotomy between structures and operations. The description 
of a ‘natural state’ is part of a rather neglected discipline, technology (Simon-
don 1989). Technology does not focus on technological applications but on 
the working principles of tools and machines. It describes the articulation 
between human skills and material forces. And, as Simondon claimed, today 
the true technologist is the laboratory scientist. The experiments on biphenyl 
molecule and E. Coli nanomotor are neither basic science nor applied science: 
they are more adequately defined as technological science (Hansson 2007). In 
technological science, it makes no sense to separate nature from the artifacts 
that give access to it. Our view of nature is necessarily dependent on artifacts. 
The notions of nature associated with nanotechnologies should therefore be 
understood from the point of view of technology as a science of operations.  14 Xavier  Guchet 
Notes
 
1  Nano Group of the French Laboratoire d’Analyse et d’Architecture des Systèmes 
(LAAS, Toulouse) led by Dr Christophe Vieu [http://www.laas.fr/laas/1-5595-
Nano-Moteur.php]. 
2  In the way Foucault, followed by Deleuze, defined this term: the dispositif (appa-
ratus) consists in ‘lines of force’ determining visible objects, affirmations that can 
be formulated, forces exercized, and subjects in position (Foucault 2001).  
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